The strategic economic goals and ambitions of Iran and the Iranian capability to attain them present a challenge that when understood could provide an opportunity in which engagement is possible. Recent events within the Middle East and the actions of Iran have resulted in significant socioeconomic and security issues within the region that warrant examination of the effectiveness of current U.S. policy. It can be argued that the future strategic environment of the Middle East is dependent upon the ability of the United States, in cooperation with international and regional partners, to effectively engage the Iranian government. Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, support of terrorism, by proxy aggression toward Israel and others, and potential emergence as a regional power further threatens to destabilize the Middle East. Iran is postured to further upset the already tenuous balance of power in the Middle East given the uncertain outcome of the Arab Spring and the withdrawal of the United States military and its international coalition partners from Iraq. This paper will explore the economic ambitions of Iran that underscore their actions and the strategic implications of these policies as they relate to the United States National Security Strategy for the region. In terms of traditional measures of economic power, Iran is the largest and arguably the most influential state within the Middle East. Iran has the second largest economy in terms of gross national product (GDP) and the second largest population in the region. 7 The proven oil and gas reserves of the Islamic Republic are the second and third largest in the world respectively and collectively represent approximately 26%of total global reserves. 8 Iran's geographic position in the Middle East, and as a bridge into Central Asia, the Caspian Basin, and the Trans-Caucasus, their transportation infrastructure and extensive coastline along the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf provide the Islamic state access to sea lines of communication for trade and the projection of naval power in these waterways, to include the Straight of Hormuz.
In this paper I will explore the economic ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and discuss the tensions, opportunities, and vulnerabilities that influence their ability to attain them in support of national interests. I will frame the discussion regarding Iran's economic aims within the context of current United States policy toward the Islamic
Republic to support the assertion that a U.S. policy of engagement through direct dialogue is the best approach to address Iran's potential emergence as a regional power.
The theocratic political structure, internal power politics, the role of quasi-state actors, Iran's national identity, and the national interests derived from the 1979 revolution all play a part in defining the economic objectives of the Islamic Republic. To better understand the economic aims of Iran it is useful to explore these dynamic relationships to identify the forces that create tension between Iran's ruling clerics, public and private institutions, the people, regional actors, and the broader international community. As these relationships emerged from the political and economic issues that arose under of the rule of the Shah during the Pahlavi Dynasty it is important to first provide the historical context that set the conditions for the revolution.
The Pahlavi Dynasty and the Pre-Revolution Economy of Iran (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) The state of the Iranian economy in the two decades preceding the 1979 revolution was one of substantial growth and prosperity. 9 Inflation averaged below 3.7%
with an annual real growth rate of 9.6% for the period of 1960 to 1977 according to World Bank records. 10 All sectors of the economy experienced significant growth and expansion as billions of dollars in oil revenues fueled government investment in urbanization, infrastructure, industry, agriculture and hydrocarbons. 11 Though the government exerted control in oil, defense, and other key industries, the private sector exercised an increasingly active role in the economy.
The 1975 Law for the Expansion of Ownership in production enterprises, as one of the principles of the Shah's White Revolution, provided for the sale of shares to workers and private investors. 12 As a result of the Shah's policies, significant private investments, and soaring oil revenues, the national output of Iran grew by nearly 1,800
percent from 1960 to 1978. 13 This period was also marked by improvements in health and education with decreases in infant mortally, malnutrition, endemic diseases, and illiteracy. The Pahlavi government's emphasis on rapid growth, modernization, social welfare reform, and expansion into the global economy appeared to produce remarkable gains to the benefit of the entire Iranian community, in large part due to land redistribution programs, job growth, higher standards of living, and low to moderate inflation. 14 However, the social health of Iran was not as vibrant as its economy. The policies of the Pahlavi regime rewarded the sociopolitical elite thus increasing the gap between the lower and upper classes, using the military and secret security force (SAVAK) to repress the voices of the middle class and a growing opposition movement. 15 By 1978 the government's expenditures in its national defense, nuclear energy industrialization, and social welfare programs exceeded revenues. Falling oil prices (largely leveraged to fund other government programs), as well as insufficient physical and plant capabilities were inadequate to meet domestic demand for imports. The economy was out of balance as rapid growth resulted in a shortage of skilled manpower, material, and energy inputs to sustain the unprecedented growth of the previous twenty years. 16 As a result of the economic imbalance, the government became increasingly vulnerable to attacks by opposition groups. In an attempt to stabilize society and the economy, the Shah instituted emergency price controls and restrictions to curb demand and fight rising inflation. 17 These measures were implemented too quickly, came too late, and proved to be ineffective in the face of high global inflation, increasing raw material costs, and decreased demand for oil on the international market. 18 In the late 1970s social unrest spread rapidly in the face of continued economic decline which threatened the Shah's tenuous hold on power in Iran.
The long history of repressive and brutal actions by the Shah's government, coupled with the poor state of the economy, rocked the confidence of the private business sector and alienated the Iranian people. 19 Despite the Shah's state rescue and recovery programs, unemployment in construction and unskilled labor industries compounded the problems facing the Pahlavi regime. 20 Critics of the Shah's regime and the momentum of opposition movements gained strength and popular support as the economic situation failed to improve. 21 The Shah's desire to achieve regional military superiority, emerge as a major industrial power within a generation, and create a Western European style welfare state had proved to be overly ambitious, ultimately resulting in the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979. 22 The return of Khomeini to Iranian soil on February 1 of that year marked the end of the longstanding Pahlavi dynasty, as the military largely withdrew to a position of neutrality and rebels took control of key sections of Tehran. 23 Power Politics in Post Revolutionary Iran
In the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran was transformed from a largely secular pro-Western monarchy into a theocratic state in which the fundamental law of the nation became that of Sharia Law. 24 The most influential leaders of the state in turn became the religious clerics of the Shi'a Islamic religion, with primary power over the state given to the Supreme Leader (Marja al Taqlid). 25 In the decades following the revolution there has been constant tension within the political landscape of the Islamic Republic comprised of the conservative right, the pragmatic right or centrists, and the reformists of the Islamic left. 26 Unlike western politics, Iranians are not divided into parties, but rather prefer to align under political factions that represent a coalition of like minded organizations. 27 The traditional hardliners of the conservative right have sought to maintain the Islamic principles that formed the foundation of the revolution by consolidating power and instituting populist economic policies. 28 There are several groups that make up the conservative bloc, such as the Combatant Clerics Association (or Jameh) and Party of God (Ansar). 29 The conservatives are primarily comprised of protectionists that fiercely defend the velayet-e-faqih system of rule by the jurisprudent, in which the Supreme Leader is granted power over all aspects of Iran's Shi'a Islamic society. 30 The pragmatists prefer more Persian focused technocratic leadership and support market oriented economic reform, including foreign investment. 31 The Since the revolution centrists such as President Rafsanjani (1989 Rafsanjani ( -1997 , and reformers such as President Khatami (1997 Khatami ( -2004 , have attempted to institute more liberal reforms without any notable success. 34 These political schools of thought were unable to sustain support for such changes in the face of opposition by conservative clerics within political and economic circles. 35 Some political factions of conservative clerics, such as the Party of God, and opposition groups have employed violence to force resignations and suppress reformist media, while using Iran's court system to halt reforms. 36 Though some reforms were ultimately instituted due to strong popular opinion, the changes were in fact unremarkable. The conservatives eventually regained Leader Ayatollah Khamenei's current policy for Iran and serve as the national narrative that underpins and subordinates all other policy. 38 As the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini's vision for an ideal Islamic society emphasized the spiritual over the material, where the economy was a secondary consideration to the religious tenets of Islam. 39 In other words, Khomeini believed that an austere and puritanical lifestyle better facilitated the intellectual, cultural, and spiritual development of man and society. 40 The Islamic Republic therefore rejected Western capitalist economic models and chose to place the majority of Iran's natural resources and key industries under government control. 41 Through public ownership the government would ensure Islamic principles were promoted in the conduct of business and served the greater good -Islam. The equitable redistribution of wealth and greater social welfare for the "deprived masses" were central concepts in Khomeini's Islamic economy. 42 The official policy was to promote social justice by reorienting the Iranian economy away from consumption, and attaining self-reliance and self-sufficiency. 43 To achieve this objective Iran had to pursue import substitutions, deter foreign investment, and reject outside pressure from free market systems. Under Article 44 of the Iranian constitution the private sector is limited, and is intended to supplement the economic activities of the cooperative and state sectors. 44 Iran's economic policies where in reality tantamount to economic isolation and ran counter to accepted international norms where the advancement of society is promoted through economic development and integration into international systems. Since the 1950's the propensity to use oil revenues as a fix for the economic and social ills, and to offset inefficiencies in public owned sectors has created an appetite for government spending that is subject to oil price fluctuations in global markets.
Additionally these funds have been used to curtail the impact from sanctions imposed on the Islamic republic since its inception, further compounding the problem of oil revenue dependency. Though Iran's oil production is limited as a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), its production capacity has not been restored to pre-revolutionary levels and remains a major hurdle to economic growth and sustainability if Iran's quotas under OPEC were to increase. Attempts at economic reform intended to address these issues have generated mixed results in recent years due to internal resistance from various groups within Iran's political establishment.
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Internal domestic economic mismanagement and poor fiscal policy have also impacted Iran's ability to overcome vulnerably in its economy. 63 The Islamic Republic's efforts to privatize industry and reduce subsidies have been slow in coming. President Ahmadinejad's continued attempts to control interest rates, and increase the money supply have not generated any marked improvement in the domestic situation and may be contributing to higher inflation rates. 64 Successful transition to a more market-based economy that encourages robust private ownership and foreign investment would have a profound positive impact on
Iran's economic situation, but the ability of Iran's leadership to effect needed changes in the face of a broad range of sanctions is questionable. In addition, internal resistance by the political elite and other influential economic stakeholders is expected to remain as a significant obstacle to reforms.
The Bonyads. These institutions are charged with providing for the disabled war veterans, aiding the poor and propagating Islam, having control of the confiscated assets of the Shah and access to nearly 40% of the nation's non oil economy. 65 The
United States and several independent analysts believe that the foundations of the bonyads channel their profits to support various ideological, political, and personal causes, wielding considerable political clout within the Islamic republic's political and economic systems. 66 These powerful foundations do not pay taxes, are only subject to oversight by the Supreme Leader, and are ripe with corruption. Any legitimate effort by the legislative, economic, or judicial bodies of the government to institute controls or reforms that jeopardize the interest of the bonyads have met with stiff opposition from the conservative clerics that operate them. 67 The Congressional Research Service, in a 2010 report on Iran's economic condition, goes on to say that many of the shares of public companies have in fact been sold to the bonyads bringing the government's efforts to privatization public industry into question. 68 Despite the considerable influence of the bonyads, they currently remain under the direct control of the Supreme Leader and their activities are therefore assumed to be approved by Khamenei. The clerics that operate the bonyads prefer that the status-quos be maintained and therefore represent some risk to the legitimacy of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad as large segments of the Iranian population and the international community view them as being ripe with corruption and elitist cronyism.
69
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As a branch of Iran's military, the IRGC is also an influential entity within Iran's economic and political systems.
Originally established in post revolutionary Iran, the IRGC has a substantial involvement in commercial activity within the construction, petrochemical (oil and gas), and telecommunications sectors that are undergoing privatization. 70 The Revolutionary guard has also won several lucrative construction contracts over private enterprise further exacerbating any real effort at economic reform. 71 The IRGC is responsible for the protection of the Supreme Leader, and by virtue of this relationship has become a major power broker in Iranian politics. The U.S. has imposed sanctions against the IRGC, asserting that the Republican Guard supports terrorism and engages in money laundering, illicit trafficking, and black market trade designed to undermine U.S.
interests and circumvent sanctions on trade. serve as the ways and means by which to achieve them. Iranian foreign policy remains "U.S. centric" in an attempt to exploit and promote anti-American sentiment around the globe using oil and gas revenues to reward its friends, partners, and allies. 73 The leaders in Tehran perceive the United States to be an existential threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic and are employing a duel track strategy of deterrence and economic competition to counter it. 74 The presence of the United States and its non-Middle Eastern coalition partners in the region restrict the ability of Iran to exert its influence to achieve regional hegemony and continue to frustrate Iran's leadership as they pursue their economic goals. The continued levying of sanctions against Iran serves to further reinforce Tehran's view of the United States as its primary opposition to achieving not only regional supremacy, but political legitimacy within the international community and recognition as a global economic player.
This presents an opportunity to engage Iran through a combination of economic incentives and normalized relations, but only if the United States clearly conveys a message to Tehran that it is willing to reexamine it policy of isolating the Islamic Republic in favor of normalized relations. Establishing diplomatic relations through third party nations, followed by direct dialogue and a series of meaningful trust building "quid pro quo" concessions could begin to cool historically heated rhetoric on the part of both
Iran and the U.S. Much like the approach taken toward China by President Nixon and
Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, a solid first step is needed to set the course for better relations over the next decade or two.
Increased Oil Refinement Capacity. Iran currently imports thirty to forty percent of its gasoline from external suppliers, which are under pressure to restrict trade activity with the Islamic republic due to sanctions. 75 Iran is actively pursuing projects to increase its crude oil processing capacity to reduce its reliance on gas imports. According to the 
Current United States Policy toward Iran
The United States has struggled to address the challenges presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of Reza Shah Pahlavi. The U.S. strategy towards relations with Iran has predominately been one which seeks to isolate the Islamic Republic though punitive diplomatic, trade, technological, and financial sanctions as motivation to change its behavior. 107 This basic framework of carrot and stick diplomacy has been employed by every administration in the past thirty-two years without generating any notable change in Iran's behavior.
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The U.S. National Security Strategy, published by the Obama administration in May 2010, goes so far as to suggest that not only has U.S. policy failed, but that Iran has become even more threatening as a result of past policy. 109 However, twenty-eight months into his first term, President Obama appears to be following the same policy to contain Iran -sanctions. It short relying more on sticks rather than carrots in dealing with Tehran.
This is not to say that sanctions imposed by the U.S., EU, and UN have not 48 Article 44 of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution stipulates that the economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: state, cooperative, and private, and is to be based on systematic and sound planning. The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the State. The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in accordance with Islamic criteria. The private sector consists of those activities concerned with agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the economic activities of the state and cooperative sectors. Ownership in each of these three sectors is protected by the laws of the Islamic Republic, in so far as this ownership is in conformity with the other articles of this chapter, does not go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, contributes to the economic growth and progress of the country, and does not harm society. The [precise] scope of each of these sectors, as well as the regulations and conditions governing their operation, will be specified by law. See Chapter 4 of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution for more articles that define the role of government in the economy and the conduct of business under Islamic law. Islamic Republic of Iran, "The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran," http://www.iranchamber.com/ government/laws/constitution_ch04.php (Accessed October 4, 2011). 49 Article 81 of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution restricts foreign enterprises and forbids the granting of concessions to foreigners or the formation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, service, or mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden. Islamic Republic of Iran, "The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran," http:// www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch06.php (Accessed October 4, 2011). 50 Curtis and Hooglund, Iran: Country Study, 150. 51 Sometimes referred to as "Islamic conglomerates," Bonyads (Persian for "foundation") are semi-private charitable Islamic foundations or trusts that are believed to wield enormous political and economic power in Iran. They were among the institutions used by the regime to help nationalize Iran's economy after the 1979 revolution. The largest Iranian charitable trust is the Foundation of the Oppressed and War Veterans (Bonyad e-Mostazafan va Janbazan, MJF). With over 200,000 employees and 350 subsidiaries, the MJF has an estimated value of more than $3 billion, at least 10% of Iran's gross domestic budget (GDP 52 Many believe that Bonyads enjoy a significant advantage over private companies. Prior to the unification of Iran's exchange rate system, the Bonyads were able to access foreign exchange at deep discounts compared to private enterprises. Bonyad officials are known to have longstanding connections with politicians, and frequently get special access to credit at state-owned banks. In addition, bonyads get privileges on taxation and import duties. Some critics contend that economic and political reform in Iran will not be significant unless bonyads are reformed. Some also contend that they contribute to political corruption and limit the funneling of oil wealth to the poor. Bonyads also may limit privatization, because shares for many of Iran's national companies undergoing privatization are given to bonyads, rather than wholly private enterprises. On the other hand, the IRGC, through its powerful connections, frequently acquires business contracts for new projects at the expense of private sector businesses. The IRGC also serves as a leading investment tool for many of Iran's leaders. Some analysts believe that the Revolutionary Guard benefits from Iran's economic isolation. With foreign businesses unwilling or unable to enter into deals, the Revolutionary Guard faces less competition for acquiring new contracts. However, because the IRGC frequently does not have the technical expertise that many international companies do, the IRGC sometimes subcontracts to international companies, making a profit as an intermediary in the transaction. Ibid., [8] [9] . 53 Ibid., 6. See also Brian Murphy, "Iran's Bonyards Stifle Economy," http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-157187519.html (Accessed November 11, 2011). 54 Keith Brandsher, New York Times, "Pressed by U.S., Asian Countries Look for Ways to Reduce Purchases of Iranian Oil," January 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/ world/middleeast/amid-pressure-on-oil-iran-plans-new-round-of-militaryexercises.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (Accessed January 10, 2012). 55 Fareed Mohamedi, "The Iran Primer: Oil and Gas Industry," http://iranprimer.usip.org/ resource/oil-and-gas-industry (Accessed 10 January 2012). 56 Iran's longstanding subsidies-to support consumption of refined oil products and natural gas-have also become a huge burden on the Iranian budget and its balance of payments. Iranians pay as little as 38 cents for a gallon of subsidized gasoline. This has resulted in runaway consumption and rising imports of gasoline. Iran currently imports up to 40 percent of its refined oil needs, because its own refineries cannot handle the volume needed for domestic consumption. Gasoline imports, which have to be paid for in hard currency at world market prices, account for around 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This, however, does not
